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Abstract
In this note, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model to explore the
e¤ects of monetary policy on endogenous market structure, economic growth and social
welfare. We nd that an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the equilibrium
number of rms. Although long-run economic growth is independent of the nominal
interest rate due to a scale-invariant property of the model, a higher nominal interest
rate leads to lower growth rates of innovation, output and consumption during the
transition path. Taking into account transition dynamics, we nd that social welfare
is decreasing in the nominal interest rate; therefore, Friedman rule is socially optimal
in this economy.
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1 Introduction
In this note, we develop a monetary Schumpeterian growth model to explore the e¤ects
of monetary policy on economic growth, social welfare and endogenous market structure
(EMS). Specically, we set up an R&D-based growth model with two dimensions of techno-
logical progress: variety expansion (i.e., horizontal innovation) and quality improvement (i.e.,
vertical innovation). In the horizontal dimension, entrepreneurs create new rms by intro-
ducing new products to the market, and the number of rms in equilibrium determines two
important elements of market structure: market concentration and rm size. In the vertical
dimension, each incumbent rm performs in-house R&D to improve the quality of its prod-
ucts, and the return to in-house R&D is determined by the size of the rm. In this economy,
technological progress and market structure are jointly determined in equilibrium: market
structure is measured by the number of rms, whereas technological progress is determined
by the growth rate of vertical innovation. In this growth-theoretic framework, we nd that
an increase in the nominal interest rate reduces labor supply via a cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint on consumption, and the reduced supply of labor decreases the number of rms
in equilibrium. Although long-run economic growth is independent of the nominal interest
rate due to a scale-invariant property of the model,1 a higher nominal interest rate leads
to lower growth rates of vertical innovation, output and consumption during the transition
path. Intuitively, when the nominal interest rate increases, the supply of labor decreases
causing lower employment per rm in the short run, which in turn reduces economic growth
temporarily. In the long run, the number of rms adjusts such that employment per rm
returns to the initial level; therefore, long-run economic growth is independent of the nomi-
nal interest rate. Furthermore, taking into account transition dynamics, we nd that social
welfare is decreasing in the nominal interest rate implying that Friedman rule is socially
optimal in this economy.2 Intuitively, the supply of labor is suboptimally low in equilibrium,
so that a positive nominal interest rate that reduces labor supply is suboptimal.
This study relates to the literature on ination and economic growth; see Tobin (1965)
for a seminal study and Wang and Yip (1992) for a discussion on di¤erent approaches of
modelling money. Studies in this literature analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy mostly in
variants of the Neoclassical growth model or the overlapping generations model. The present
study instead relates to a more recent subbranch of this literature that analyzes the e¤ects of
monetary policy in R&D-based growth models; see for example, Marquis and Re¤ett (1994),
Chu and Lai (2012), Chu et al. (2012) and Chu and Cozzi (2012). The present study di¤ers
from these studies by analyzing the e¤ects of monetary policy in a more recent vintage of
R&D-based growth models based on Peretto (2007) in which both the number of rms and
the growth rate of vertical innovation are endogenous; in other words, we consider a scale-
invariant Schumpeterian growth model with EMS. Unlike previous studies, we nd that
monetary policy has no e¤ect on long-run economic growth; instead, monetary policy a¤ects
economic growth during the transition path. Furthermore, the abovementioned studies do
not analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on EMS; see Peretto (1996, 1999) for seminal
studies in R&D-based growth models with EMS and Etro (2012) for an excellent textbook
1See Jones (1999) and Laincz and Peretto (2006) for a discussion of scale e¤ects in R&D growth models.
2See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) for a discussion of Friedman rule.
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treatment. Therefore, this study also contributes to the literature with a novel result that the
long-run e¤ects of monetary policy in an R&D-based growth model with EMS are reected in
the number of rms instead of the growth rate. Furthermore, we analyze optimal monetary
policy by analytically deriving the complete changes in welfare on the transition path.
The rest of this note is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
analyzes the e¤ects of monetary policy. The nal section concludes.
2 A monetary Schumpeterian growth model with EMS
In this section, we present the monetary Schumpeterian growth model. In summary, the
theoretical framework is based on the Schumpeterian model with in-house R&D and EMS
in Peretto (2007). We incorporate money demand into the model via a CIA constraint on
consumption, under which monetary policy a¤ects the economy by distorting households
tradeo¤ between consumption and leisure. Furthermore, we provide a complete closed-form
solution for the economys balanced growth path as well as its transition dynamics.
2.1 Households
There is a unit continuum of identical households, who have a lifetime utility function.
U =
1Z
0
e t lnutdt =
1Z
0
e t[ln ct +  ln(L  lt)]dt, (1)
where ct denotes consumption of nal goods (numeraire) at time t and lt denotes labor
supply. The parameters  > 0 and  > 0 determine respectively subjective discounting and
leisure preference. Each household maximizes (1) subject to the following asset-accumulation
equation.
_at + _mt = rtat + wtlt +  t   ct   tmt. (2)
at is the real value of assets owned by each household, and rt is the real interest rate. Each
household has a labor endowment of L units and elastically supplies lt units to earn a real
wage rate wt. The household also faces a lump-sum transfer (or tax)  t from the government.
t is the ination rate that determines the cost of holding money, and mt is the real money
balance held by each household to facilitate purchases of consumption goods. The CIA
constraint is given by ct  mt, where the parameter  2 (0; 1] determines the importance
of the CIA constraint.
The optimality condition of consumption is
1
ct
= t(1 + it), (3)
where t is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on (2) and it = rt + t is the nominal interest
rate. The optimality condition of labor supply is
wt(L  lt) = ct(1 + it). (4)
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The intertemporal optimality condition is
  _t
t
= rt   . (5)
In the case of a constant nominal interest rate i, combining (3) and (5) yields the familiar
Euler equation _ct=ct = rt   .
2.2 Final goods
Final goods Yt are produced by competitive rms using the following production function.
Yt =
Z Nt
0
Xt (j)[Z

t (j)Z
1 
t ly;t(j)]
1 dj, (6)
where ;  2 (0; 1) and Xt(j) denotes intermediate goods j 2 [0; Nt]. The productivity of
ly;t(j) workers using intermediate goods Xt(j) depends on its quality Zt(j) and on average
quality Zt  1Nt
R Nt
0
Zt(j)dj. The conditional demand function for ly;t(j) is
ly;t(j) =

1  
wt
1=
Xt(j)[Z

t (j)Z
1 
t ]
(1 )=, (7)
whereas the conditional demand function for Xt(j) is
Xt(j) =


pt(j)
1=(1 )
Zt (j)Z
1 
t ly;t(j), (8)
where pt(j) denotes the price ofXt(j) denominated in units of Yt. Perfect competition implies
that the nal goods producers pay Yt =
R Nt
0
pt(j)Xt(j)dj to intermediate goods rms and
pay (1  )Yt =
R Nt
0
wtly;t(j)dj to workers.3
2.3 Intermediate goods
There is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated intermediate goods Xt(j) for
j 2 [0; Nt]. Each industry is dominated by a monopolistic rm that has price-setting power.
In the following subsections, we describe the behaviors of incumbents and entrants. In the
vertical dimension, each incumbent performs in-house R&D to improve the quality of its
products as an attempt to obtain a larger share of the market. In the horizontal dimension,
entrepreneurs make entry decisions and compete with incumbents for market share. Through
the entry of rms, the number of rms and the size of each rm are endogenously determined
in equilibrium.
3Free movement of workers across rms implies that wages must be equal across rms.
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2.3.1 Incumbents
Existing intermediate goods rms produce di¤erentiated goods with a technology that re-
quires one unit of nal goods to produce one unit of intermediate goods. The rm in industry
j 2 [0; Nt] incurs Zt (j)Z1 t units of nal goods as a xed operating cost. To improve the
quality of its products, the rm invests Rt(j) units of nal goods in R&D, and the innovation
process is
_Zt(j) = Rt(j). (9)
The cash ow of rm j 2 [0; Nt] is
Ft(j) = [pt(j)  1]Xt(j)  Zt (j)Z1 t , (10)
and the ow prot is
t(j) = Ft(j) Rt(j). (11)
Therefore, the value of the monopolistic rm in industry j 2 [0; Nt] is
Vt(j) =
Z 1
t
exp

 
Z u
t
rsds

u(j)du. (12)
Taking the conditional demand function (8) as given, the rm sets its own price and de-
votes resources to in-house R&D to maximize Vt(j). The current-value Hamiltonian for this
optimization problem is4
Ht(j) = t(j) + qt(j) _Zt(j). (13)
In Lemma 1, we derive the return to in-house R&D and nd that it is increasing in rm size
measured by employment per rm lt=Nt.
Lemma 1 The return to in-house R&D is given by
rIt = 

(1+)=(1 )(1  ) lt
Nt
  

. (14)
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.3.2 Entrants
A rm that is active at time t must have been born at some earlier date. A new rm pays
a sunk setup cost Xt(j) at time t to set up its operation and introduce a new variety of
products to the market.5 We refer to this process as entry. Suppose entry is positive (i.e.,
_Nt > 0). Then, it must be the case that
Vt(j) = Xt(j). (15)
4See Appendix A for the solution of this optimization problem.
5It is useful to note that the setup cost is proportional to the new rms initial output. This assumption
captures the idea that the setup cost depends on the amount of productive assets required to start production;
see Peretto (2007) for a discussion.
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Following the standard approach in this class of models, we consider a symmetric equilibrium
in which Zt(j) = Zt for j 2 [0; Nt].6 Under symmetry, Vt(j) = Vt, and the familiar Bellman
equation implies that the return to entry is
rEt =
t
Vt
+
_Vt
Vt
. (16)
2.4 Monetary authority
The nominal money supply is denoted by Mt, and its growth rate is t  _Mt=Mt. The
real money balance is mt = Mt=Pt, where Pt is the price of nal goods. The monetary
policy instrument that we consider is it.7 Given an exogenously chosen it by the monetary
authority, the ination rate is endogenously determined according to t = it   rt. Then,
given t, the growth rate of the nominal money supply is endogenously determined according
to t = t + _mt=mt. Finally, the monetary authority returns the seigniorage revenue as a
lump transfer  t = _Mt=Pt = _mt + tmt to households.
2.5 Aggregation
Under symmetry, the labor market clearing condition becomes
lt = Ntly;t. (17)
The resource constraint of nal goods is
Yt = ct +Nt(Xt + Zt +Rt) + Xt _Nt. (18)
Substituting (8) into (6) and imposing symmetry yield the aggregate production function.
Yt =


pt(j)
=(1 )
ZtNtly;t = 
2=(1 )Ztlt, (19)
where the second equality uses (17) and markup pricing pt(j) = 1=.
2.6 Equilibrium
The equilibrium is a time path of allocations fmt; at; ct; Yt; lt; ly;t(j); Xt(j); Rt(j)g, prices
frt; wt; pt(j); Vtg and policy fitg. Also, at each instance of time, the following holds:
 Households maximize utility taking frt; wt; tg as given;
6See Peretto (1998, 1999, 2007) for a discussion of the conditions under which the symmetric equilibrium
is a reasonable equilibrium concept in this class of models.
7It is useful to note that on the balanced growth path, i = r +  = + .
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 Competitive nal goods rms maximize prots taking fwt; pt(j)g as given;
 Incumbents in the intermediate goods sector choose fpt(j); Rt(j)g to maximize the
present value of prots taking frtg as given;
 Entrants make entry decision to the intermediate goods sector taking fVtg as given;
 The monetary authority balances budget such that  t = _mt + tmt;
 The value of all existing monopolistic rms adds up to the value of householdsassets
such that at = NtVt;
 The market-clearing condition of labor holds;
 Finally, the market-clearing condition of nal goods holds.
3 Growth and welfare e¤ects of monetary policy
In this section, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the equilibrium number of rms,
economic growth and social welfare. Specically, we consider the e¤ects of the nominal
interest rate i. In Section 3.1, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced
growth path. In Section 3.2, we analyze e¤ects of monetary policy on the transition path.
3.1 E¤ects of monetary policy on the balanced growth path
In Appendix A, we show that the consumption-output ratio ct=Yt jumps to a unique and
stable steady-state value.
Lemma 2 The consumption-output ratio ct=Yt jumps to a unique and stable steady-state
value given by
(c=Y ) = 1   + 2. (20)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Given a constant nominal interest rate i and a stationary consumption-output ratio, one
can use (4) to show that the supply of labor lt also jumps to its steady-state value given by
l =

1 + (1 + i)

1 +
2
1  
 1
L. (21)
Equation (21) shows that the equilibrium supply of labor is decreasing in the nominal interest
rate i. Intuitively, an increase in the nominal interest rate increases the cost of consumption
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due to the CIA constraint; as a result, households reduce consumption and increase leisure.
Given that labor supply is stationary, (19) and (20) imply that
_Zt
Zt
=
_Yt
Yt
=
_ct
ct
= rt   , (22)
where the last equality uses the Euler equation. Setting rIt = rt, one can then use (14) and
(22) to derive the equilibrium growth rate given by
gt 
_Zt
Zt
= max



(1+)=(1 )(1  ) l

Nt
  

  ; 0

, (23)
which is increasing in rm size measured by employment per rm l=Nt; see Laincz and
Peretto (2006) for empirical evidence. The growth rate gt would be strictly positive if and
only if
Nt < N  
(1+)=(1 )(1  )
+ =
l.
In Appendix A, we provide the derivations of the dynamics of Nt.
Lemma 3 The growth rate of Nt is given by
_Nt
Nt
=
(
1 

 

+
_Zt
Zt

Nt
2=(1 )l
   if Nt < N
1 

   Nt
2=(1 )l
   if Nt > N
)
. (24)
Proof. See Appendix A.
In the following Lemma, we derive the steady-state values of Nt = N and gt = g. Also,
we provide the parameter restrictions that ensure N 2 (0; N) and g > 0.8
Lemma 4 Under the parameter restrictions that 1 

   <  < (1 )(1 )

, the economy is
stable and has a positive and unique steady-state value of Nt as well as a positive and unique
steady-state growth rate given by
N =

(1  ) (1  )

  

2=(1 )l
(1  )   > 0, (25)
g = 

(1+)=(1 )(1  ) l

N
  

   = (+ )   (1  )
(1  ) (1  )=   > 0. (26)
8In this model, we have assumed zero population growth, so that Nt converges to a steady state. If we
assume positive population growth, it would be the number of rms per capita that converges to a steady
state instead, and our main results would be unchanged.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
In the following proposition, we provide our rst main result. We nd that an increase
in i reduces the steady-state equilibrium number of rms but does not a¤ect the steady-
state equilibrium growth rate. Intuitively, an increase in i reduces the supply of labor l in
(21), which in turn leads to a decrease in the steady-state equilibrium number of rms N.
However, due to the scale-invariant property of the model, steady-state employment per rm
l=N remains unchanged; as a result, the steady-state equilibrium growth rate in (26) is
independent of the nominal interest rate.
Proposition 5 The steady-state equilibrium number of rms is decreasing in the nominal
interest rate, whereas the steady-state equilibrium growth rate is independent of the nominal
interest rate.
Proof. Note (21), (25) and (26).
3.2 E¤ects of monetary policy on the transition path
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of monetary policy on the transition path. The
model features transition dynamics because Nt is a state variable that gradually converges
to its state-state value N. When the monetary authority increases the nominal interest
rate, the equilibrium supply of labor l adjusts instantly, but the equilibrium number of
rms adjusts slowly. Given that the equilibrium growth rate is determined by employment
per rm l=Nt, monetary policy could have an e¤ect on economic growth during transition
dynamics. Indeed, in the following proposition, we show that an increase in the nominal
interest rate reduces the growth rates of vertical innovation, output and consumption on the
transition path. Figure 1 illustrates the transitional e¤ects of an increase in the nominal
interest rate at time t.
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Proposition 6 An increase in the nominal interest rate reduces the growth rates of vertical
innovation, output and consumption on the transition path.
Proof. Note (21), (22) and (23). Also, recall that Nt is a state variable.
Finally, we analyze the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Specically, we consider the
e¤ects of i on ow utility lnut and show that @ lnut=@i < 0 for any arbitrary t, which is
su¢ cient for @U=@i < 0 because U =
R1
0
e t lnutdt. Taking the log of (19), we obtain
lnYt =
2
1   ln  + lnZt + ln lt =
2
1   ln  +
Z t
0
gsds+ ln l
, (27)
where we have normalized Z0 = 1. Taking the log of (20), we obtain
ln ct = ln(1   + 2) + lnYt. (28)
Substituting (27) and (28) into ow utility lnut in (1) and then di¤erentiating it with respect
to i yield
@ lnut
@i
=
Z t
0
@gs
@i
ds| {z }
 
+
@ ln l
@i| {z }
 
+ 
@ ln(L  l)
@i| {z }
+
. (29)
In other words, an increase in the nominal interest rate has the following three e¤ects on
social welfare. First, it reduces welfare by decreasing the growth rate of vertical innovation,
output and consumption. Second, it reduces welfare by decreasing labor supply l, which in
turn decreases the levels of output and consumption. Third, it improves welfare by increasing
leisure L   l. Although the overall welfare e¤ects appear to be ambiguous, we nd that
@ lnut=@i < 0 because the equilibrium supply of labor is suboptimally low, so that any
increase in i that reduces l is welfare-worsening. To see this result,
@ ln l
@l
+ 
@ ln(L  l)
@l
=
L  (1 + )l
l(L  l) > 0 (30)
because L=(1+) > l in (21). Finally, we summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Social welfare is decreasing in the nominal interest rate; therefore, Friedman
rule (i.e., a zero nominal interest rate) is socially optimal in this economy.
Proof. Note (29) and (30). Also, recall that @l=@i < 0.
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4 Conclusion
In this note, we have analyzed the e¤ects of monetary policy on economic growth, social
welfare and endogenous market structure in a scale-invariant Schumpeterian growth model.
A novel result is that monetary policy a¤ects economic growth only in the short run; in the
long run, the e¤ects of monetary policy are reected in market structure measured by the
number of rms in equilibrium. This result di¤ers from previous studies that analyze the
e¤ects of monetary policy in R&D-based growth models with either horizontal or vertical
innovation, but not both. Furthermore, we analyze optimal monetary policy by analytically
deriving the complete changes in welfare on the transition path.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (8), (10) and (11) into (13) yields
Ht(j) = 

Zt (j)Z
1 
t ly;t(j)
1 
[Xt(j)]
  Xt(j)  Zt (j)Z1 t  Rt(j) + qt(j)Rt(j). (A1)
The rst-order conditions include
@Ht(j)
@Xt(j)
= 0, pt(j) = 

Zt (j)Z
1 
t ly;t(j)
Xt(j)
1 
=
1

, (A2)
@Ht(j)
@Rt(j)
= 0, qt(j) = 1, (A3)
@Ht(j)
@Zt(j)
= (1 )

Zt (j)Z
1 
t ly;t(j)
1 
[Xt(j)]

Zt(j)
 Z 1t (j)Z1 t = rIt qt(j)  _qt(j). (A4)
Substituting (A2) and (A3) into (A4) yields
rIt = 
h
(1  )(1+)=(1 )ly;t   
i
, (A5)
where we have applied Zt(j) = Zt. Finally, substituting (17) into (A5) yields (14).
Proof of Lemma 2. Substituting  t = _mt + tmt into (2) yields
_at = rtat + wtlt   ct. (A6)
Then, substituting (15) into at = VtNt yields
at = XtNt = 
ptXtNt
pt
= 2Yt, (A7)
where the last equality uses (A2) and ptXtNt = Yt. Substituting (A7) into (A6) yields
_Yt
Yt
=
_at
at
= rt +
wtlt   ct
2Yt
. (A8)
Substituting the Euler equation and wtlt = (1  )Yt into (A8) yields
_ct
ct
 
_Yt
Yt
=
ct=Yt
2
 

1  
2
+ 

. (A9)
Therefore, the dynamics of ct=Yt is characterized by saddle-point stability such that ct=Yt
must jump to its steady-state value in (20).
Proof of Lemma 3. Substituting (10), (11), (15) and (A2) into (16) yields
rEt =
1  

  Zt +Rt
Xt
+
_Xt
Xt
, (A10)
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where we have applied Zt(j) = Zt and _Vt=Vt = _Xt=Xt. Substituting (17) and (A2) into (8)
yields
Xt = 
2=(1 )Zt
l
Nt
. (A11)
Substituting (9) and (A11) into (A10) yields
rEt =
1  

 
 
+
_Zt
Zt
!
Nt
2=(1 )l
+
_Zt
Zt
 
_Nt
Nt
, (A12)
where we have used _Xt=Xt = _Zt=Zt   _Nt=Nt. Setting rEt = rt and substituting (22) into
(A12) yield the dynamics of Nt given by9
_Nt
Nt
=
1  

 
 
+
_Zt
Zt
!
Nt
2=(1 )l
  . (A13)
Equation (A13) describes the dynamics of Nt when Nt < N  
(1+)=(1 )(1 )
+=
l. When
Nt > N , _Zt=Zt = 0 as shown in (23).
Proof of Lemma 4. This proof proceeds as follows. First, we prove that under  <
min
n
(1  ), (1 )(1 )

o
, there exists a stable, unique and positive steady-state value of
Nt. Then, we prove that under  > 1    , the growth rate of vertical innovation is
strictly positive. Finally, the above parameter conditions can be merged into 1 

   <
 < (1 )(1 )

, which ensures (1 )(1 )

< (1 ). We consider the equilibrium under which
there is positive in-house R&D. Substituting (23) into the rst equation of (24) yields
_Nt
Nt
=
  (1  )
2=(1 )l
Nt +
(1  )(1  )

  . (A14)
Because Nt is a state variable, the dynamics of Nt is stable if and only if  < (1   ).
Solving _Nt = 0, we obtain the steady-state value of Nt in an economy with positive in-house
R&D.
N =

(1  )(1  )

  

2=(1 )l?
(1  )   . (A15)
Given  < (1  ), (A15) shows that N > 0 if and only if
 <
(1  )(1  )

. (A16)
Combining  < (1  ) and (A16) yields
 < min

(1  ), (1  )(1  )


. (A17)
Substituting (A15) into (23) yields (26). Given (A16), (26) shows that g > 0 if and only if
 > 1 

  .
9It is useful to note that we have followed the standard approach in this class of models to treat entry
and exit symmetrically (i.e., the scrap value of exiting an industry is also Xt); therefore, Vt = Xt always
holds. Otherwise, there would be an innite number of either entries or exits.
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